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COMMENTS
GAGLIARDI v. FLINT: THE JOINDER OF, CONSTITUTIONAL
AND PENDENT STATE CLAIMS AGAINST A MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION IN A FEDERAL FORUM
Municipal governments' assumption of greater responsibility for
societal functions increasingly exposes citizens to the infliction of
legal injury by public employees.1 Relief for such injuries ostensibly
is offered by the Civil Rights Act of 1871,2 which was enacted to
provide redress for actions by state and local officials violating es-
tablished constitutional and statutory rights .3 The Act's broadest
provision, codified as section 1983, awards damages and equitable
relief for invasion of such rights by persons acting under color of
state law or custom.4
A citizen asserting a section 1983 claim may desire to maximize
1. See Sherry, The Myth That the King Can Do No Wrong: A Comparative Study of the
Sovereign Immunity Doctrine in the United States and New York Court of Claims, 22 AD.
L. Ra'. 39, 58 (1969). Municipal involvement ranges from the provision of public services such
as education, housing, and fire and police protection to the regulation of business activity
through the licensing of such activities as housing construction and the sale of alcoholic
beverages.
2. Civil Rights Act, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970)
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)).
3. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1961) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st
Sess. 653 (1871)).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depri-
vation of any rights, priviliges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
The federal district court's original jurisdiction over a § 1983 cause of action is provided by
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)-(4) (1970), which provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action author-
ized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured
by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing
for equal rights of citizens of or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States;
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act
of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to
vote.
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his opportunity for complete recovery by seeking relief against both
the culpable public employee and the municipality. In Monroe v.
Pape,I however, the Supreme Court held that municipalities are not
"persons" within the ambit of section 1983,1 in effect granting mu-
nicipal corporations immunity from civil liability under the Civil
Rights Act. Focusing on the legislative history of the Act, the Court
emphasized that the House of Representatives repeatedly had re-
jected the opportunity to impose such liability on local government
units; consequently, the Court reasoned, municipalities could not
be sued under section 1983.1
Although numerous attempts to circumvent the holding in
Monroe have proved unsuccessful, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in Gagliardi v. Flint' recently upheld an action
against a municipal corporation by finding the fourteenth amend-
ment allegations sufficiently substantial to provide a jurisdictional
basis for the federal forum to adjudge pendent state claims. In addi-
tion to examining several approaches advanced by plaintiffs in at-
tempts to provide federal courts with jurisdiction over municipali-
ties, this Comment will analyze Gagliardi and the procedure ap-
proved by the Third Circuit. It concludes that the implementation
5. See notes 62-69 infra & accompanying text.
6. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
7. Id. at 191. Monroe involved an action for damages against the city of Chicago and
thirteen Chicago police officers who allegedly subjected the plaintiff, Monroe, to a brutal
search and seizure in his home.
8. Id. at 191-92. The interpretation of § 1983 adopted by the Court in Monroe has been
assailed vigorously by both the judiciary and commentators who have argued, for example,
that this construction derives neither from legislative debate over the meaning of the word
"person" nor from debate on § 1983 generally, but rather from congressional rejection of the
Sherman amendment, which would have made local governments expressly liable for dam-
ages caused by their intentional infringement of certain constitutionally protected interests.
Moreover, only the House of Representatives rejected the amendment, a repudiation based
not on the determination that municipalities should be immune, but on the mistaken notion
that the Congress lacked constitutional authority to impose liability on municipal corpora-
tions. See generally Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Gagliardi v. Flint, 564 F.2d 112, 122-26 (1977) (Gibbons, J., concurring); Kates & Kouba,
Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. 1Ev.
131, 132-36 (1972); Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities for Constitutional
Violations, 89 HARv. L. Rxv. 922, 924-25, 949-51 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Damage
Remedies]; Note, Developing Governmental Liability Under 42 US. C. § 1983, 55 MiNN. L.
Rxv. 1201, 1205-07 (1971). But see Note, Implying a Damage Remedy Against Municipalities
Directly Under the Fourteenth Amendment: Congressional Action as an Obstacle to Exten-
sion of the Bivens Doctrine, 36 MD. L. Rav. 123 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Implying a
Damage Remedy].
9. 564 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1977).
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by federal courts of this jurisdictional basis will leave undisturbed
Monroe's interpretation of section 1983 but will permit citizens to
seek redress from many municipal corporations for constitutional
infringements committed by their employees.
OBSTACLES TO IMPOSING LIABILITY ON A MUNICIPALITY IN FEDERAL
COURT
Attempts to sue municipal corporations and thus to bypass the
decision in Monroe have been based either on theories purporting
to sustain independent causes of action in conjunction with federal
question jurisdiction"0 or on state claims deemed pendent to section
1983 actions against individuals included within that provision's
definition of person. For example, in Moor v. County of Alameda,"1
decided by the Supreme Court in 1973, the plaintiffs argued that the
incorporation into section 1983 of a California statute creating vicar-
ious liability against local governments created an independent fed-
eral cause of action. 2 Under a separate federal statutory provision,
codified as section 1988,11 state law may be incorporated into a
10. Two statutes arguably provide federal question jurisdiction for independent causes of
action. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970) provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States." In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) grants federal question jurisdiction
for § 1983 causes of action. For the text of § 1343(3), see note 4 supra. In City of Kenosha v.
Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973), however, the Supreme Court determined that jurisdiction under
§ 1343 was unavailable in § 1983 suits against municipalities. Id. at 513; see notes 16-17 infra
& accompanying text. The ambiguity in Bruno's holding has caused courts and commentators
to argue that the case restricts the applicability of § 1343 solely to § 1983 actions. See Blue
v. Craig, 505 F.2d 830, 837 (4th Cir. 1974) ( § 1343 and § 1983 co-extensive); Comment, The
Civil Rights Acts and Mr. Monroe, 49 CAL. L. Rav. 145, 148 (1961) ("authorized by law" in §
1343 refers to § 1983). Contra, Gonzalez v. Young, 560 F.2d 160, 166 (3d Cir. 1977);
Bodensteiner, Federal Court Jurisdiction of Suits Against "Nonpersons" for Deprivations of
Constitutional Rights, 8 VAL. U. L. Ray. 215, 229-34 (1974); Hundt, Suing Municipalities
Directly Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 Nw. U. L. Rav. 770,772 n.13 (1975). Whether
§ 1343 provides jurisdiction for independent causes of action has not been expressly deter-
mined by the Court. See Bodensteiner, supra, at 234.
11. 411 U.S. 693 (1973). Plaintiffs sought to recover actual and punitive damages for
injuries allegedly suffered when an Alameda County deputy sheriff, who was engaged in
quelling a civil distrubance, wrongfully discharged a shotgun. Suit was brought against the
individual sheriffs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1970), and against the county under
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 (1970). Id. at 695-96.
12. Id. at 698. Plaintiffs argued that 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970) permitted the incorpora-
tion of CAL. Gov'T CODE § 815.2(a) (West 1966) into § 1983 and that, consequently, federal
jurisdiction over their action existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970). 411 U.S. at 700-01.
For the pertinent text of § 1343(4), see note 4 supra.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
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federal civil rights act whenever the federal law is "deficient in the
provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies."" The Supreme
Court, however, rejected the argument that section 1988 authorized
the integration of California state law into section 1983, concluding
that such an incorporation would be contrary to Congress' intent
in enacting the latter section."
One month after the decision in Moor, the plaintiff in City of
Kenosha v. Bruno" endeavored to restrict Monroe's application to
actions against municipalities for the recovery of damages and
argued that section 1983 permits suits for equitable relief. Rejecting
this argument, the Supreme Court held that municipal corporations
are outside the ambit of section 1983, whether relief is sought in law
or in equity.17 Thus, after Monroe, Moor, and Bruno, the Court
conclusively had excluded municipalities as potential defendants in
section 1983 suits. 8
Plaintiffs' inability to sue municipal corporations under section
1983 encouraged them to resort to direct causes of action implicitly
authorized by the Constitution. The basis for these actions was the
1971 decision of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 19 in which the Supreme Court permitted a
damages suit against federal narcotics agents who allegedly had
[I]n all cases where [federal laws] are not adopted to the object, or are defi-
cient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offen-
ses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution
and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or
criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said
courts in the trial and disposition of the cause ....
14. Id.
15. 411 U.S. at 710. The Court evaluated the language and the legislative history of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871, concluding both that § 1988 did not create an independent cause of
action and that the attempted incorporation of the state statute into § 1983 would contravene
the federal law as represented in Monroe. Id. at 703-09.
16. 412 U.S. 507 (1973). Bruno sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the cities
of Kenosha and Racine, which had refused to renew his liquor licenses, allegedly because he
permitted nude dancing in his taverns. In each case, the plaintiff named only the municipal-
ity as a defendant.
17. Id. at 513. As in Moor, see note 15 supra, the Court in Bruno relied on the statutory
language as well as the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 to support its
determination that Congress did not intend to subject municipal corporations to a
"bifurcated application" of § 1983 that would vary with the nature of the relief sought. Id.
18. For a listing of the governmental entities excluded from § 1983 liability, see Hundt,
supra note 10, at 772 n.15; 47 Miss. L.J. 799, 802-03 & nn.25-29 (1976).
19. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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deprived the plaintiff of his fourth amendment rights." Although
the facts in Bivens were limited to claims arising from fourth
amendment violations, the case's result suggested that the infringe-
ment of any constitutional right could create a claim litigable in a
federal court, thus permitting suits against municipalities.21
Attempting to extend the holding in Bivens, plaintiffs have
argued that the fourteenth amendment protects their federal rights
from infringement by state and local governments.2 2 The availabil-
ity of the remedy recognized in Bivens, however, has been uncer-
tain, and the lower courts have reached conflicting conclusions as
to the case's applicability in suits against municipal corporations.
Although some courts have restricted the scope of Bivens to fourth
amendment violations,2 others have extended the case's holding to
all federal claims based on alleged constitutional infringementsu
and thus have permitted damages suits for alleged violations of the
fourteenth amendment.? In addition to the judiciary's division over
20. Id. at 397.
21. See Bodensteiner, supra note 10, at 221; Hundt, supra note 10, at 772; Damage Reme-
dies, supra note 8, at 926. Of course, a potential plaintiff must satisfy the jurisdictional
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970). For the text of § 1331(a), see note 10 supra.
22. For analyses of the use of Bivens to support a judicially created cause of action asserting
fourteenth amendment rights directly against a municipality, see Bodensteiner, supra note
10, at 217-22; Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L.
Rzv. 1532 (1972); Hundt, supra note 10, at 772-75; Damage Remedies, supra note 8, at 929-
59.
23. See, e.g., Moore v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 163, 165 (D. Colo. 1974); Davidson v.
Kane, 337 F. Supp. 922, 924-25 (E.D. Va. 1972). See also Cardinale v. Washington Technical
Inst., 500 F.2d 791, 796 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Archuleta v. Callaway, 385 F. Supp. 384, 388
(D. Colo. 1974); Smothers v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 351 F. Supp. 622, 625-26 n.4
(C.D. Cal. 1972) (dictum).
24. Brault v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 730, 734 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, id. at
736 (1975) (en banc); accord, Gardes v. Murphy, 377 F. Supp. 1389, 1398 (N.D. fI1. 1974)
("Bivens recognizes a cause of action for damages for violation of any constitutionally pro-
tected interest."); see States Marine Lines v. Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146, 1156-57 (4th Cir. 1974)
(fifth amendment); United States ex rel. Moore v. Koezler, 457 F.2d 892, 894 (3d Cir. 1972)
(fifth amendment); Bethea v. Reid, 445 F.2d 1163, 1164-65 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1061 (1972) (fourth and fifth amendments); Williams v. Brown, 398 F. Supp. 155, 156
(N.D. 111. 1975) (fourteenth amendment); Revis v. Laird, 391 F. Supp. 1133, 1138-39 (E.D.
Cal. 1975) (first and fifth amendments).
25. Fourteenth amendment claims have been recognized in suits involving, inter alia,
police misconduct, Redding v. Medicci, 402 F. Supp. 1260, 1261 (W.D. Pa. 1975), vacated on
other grounds, 411 F. Supp. 272 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Williams v. Brown, 398 F. Supp. 155, 156
(N.D. 111. 1975) (illegal arrest and detention); mistreatment in prison, Wattenberg v. New
York City, Dep't of Correction, 376 F. Supp. 41, 43-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (cruel and unusual
punishment); dismissals of public employees, Hostrop v. Board of Jr. College Dist. No. 515,
523 F.2d 569, 576-77 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976); Skehan v. Board of
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the ultimate breadth of Bivens, several courts either have refused
to recognize the existence of a constitutional cause of action against
municipalities"6 or have been reluctant to adjudicate the issues in-
volved in such suits.Y The disparate holdings by lower courts con-
cerning the applicability of Bivens have cast doubt on the viability
of direct constitutional attacks against municipal defendants. 21
Alternative attempts to sue municipalities have been based on
the theory of pendent jurisdiction, which "permits a plaintiff, in
appropriate circumstances, to join with his federal claim a state
claim over which the court has no independent basis of subject
matter jurisdiction."29 In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs"' the Su-
preme Court articulated the two prerequisites for obtaining pendent
Trustees, 501 F.2d 31, 44 (3d Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 421 U.S. 983 (1975);
Barszcz v. Board of Trustees of Community College, 400 F. Supp. 675, 676 (N.D. Ill. 1975),
cert. dismissed, 429 U.S. 1080 (1977); see Singleton v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 501 F.2d
429, 432-33 (4th Cir. 1974) (Winter, J., concurring and dissenting); racial discrimination,
Wright v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 393 F. Supp. 1149, 1152 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (backpay
and reinstatement); Robinson v. Conlisk, 385 F. Supp. 529, 536 (N.D. Ill. 1974), aff'd in
pertinent part, rev'd on other grounds, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977); deprivation of property
without due process of law, Amen v. City of Dearborn, 532 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1976); Brault
v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 730, 732-35 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, id. at 736 (1975)
(en banc); Donohue Constr. Co. v. Maryland Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n, 398
F. Supp. 21, 23-24 & n.2 (1975); Stephens v. City of Plano, 375 F. Supp. 985, 986 (E.D. Tex.
1974); Grisson v. County of Roanoke, 348 F. Supp. 321, 322 (W.D. Va. 1972); see Dahl v. City
of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (zoning); and other alleged constitutional
violations. See, e.g., Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1975) (action for damages for
sterilization under allegedly unconstitutional statute).
26. Courts often have dismissed § 1983 suits against municipalities without acknowledging
that claims might exist under the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Jones v. Marshall, 528
F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1975); Burton v. Waller, 502 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 964 (1975); Howard v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1972).
27. The Third Circuit avoided reaching a decision on the merits of an action based directly
on the fourteenth amendment in Mahoney v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1977). The Third
Circuit also failed to decide the "difficult and troublesome constitutional questions" of
"substantive liability and municipal immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment." Fine v.
City of New York, 529 F.2d 70, 76 & n.13 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Brault v. Town of Milton,
527 F.2d 736, 738 (2d Cir. 1975) (en banc); Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
28. See Gagliardi v. Flint, 564 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1977), in which the majority and concurring
opinions debated at length whether the Third Circuit has recognized such a cause of action.
Id. at 115 n.3, 117-19. The principal rationale for rejecting the extension of Bivens to four-
teenth amendment claims against municipalities derives from the concept of federalism and
from the Court's interpretation of congressional intent underlying § 1983. Damage Remedies,
supra note 8, at 927-29. See also Hundt, supra note 10, at 773-75; Comment, Aldinger v.
Howard and Pendent Jurisdiction, 77 COLUM. L. Rav. 127, 138 n.58 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Pendent Jurisdiction]; Implying a Damage Remedy, supra note 8, at 124-25.
29. Pendent Jurisdiction, supra note 28, at 128. For a comprehensive history of the doc-
trine's evolution, see id. at 129-35. See also Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 6-16 (1976).
30. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
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jurisdiction: first, the federal claim must be of sufficient substance
to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court;3' and second, the
state and federal claims must derive from a "common nucleus of
operative fact", 3 such that they ordinarily would be tried together
in one judicial proceeding. 33 If these prerequisites were met, a plain-
tiff would make a municipality a pendent party by joining his state
cause of action against the municipality to a section 1983 claim
against the culpable official."
The Supreme Court's decision in Aldinger v. Howard,3 5 however,
limited the availability of this procedure. Distinguishing pendent
claims from pendent parties, the Court held that the doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction does not authorize the joinder of a state claim
against a party over whom no independent federal jurisdiction ex-
31. Id. at 725.
32. Id. Decisions subsequent to Gibbs have held that a loose factual connection between
the claims is sufficient to satisfy this "common nucleus" requirement. See, e.g., Klaus v. Hi-
Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975); Hamilton v. Chaffin, 506 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1975);
Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Burton v. Waller, 502 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964 (1974); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970); Knuth v. Erie Crawford Daily Coop. Ass'n, 395 F.2d 420 (3d Cir.
1968); Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Bowman v. Hartig, 334
F. Supp. 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). If the two claims are totally independent, however, the
district court may exercise its jurisdiction only over the federal action. See, e.g., PAAC v.
Rizzo, 502 F.2d 306 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1108 (1974); Hales v. Winn-Dixie Stores,
Inc., 500 F.2d 836 (4th Cir. 1974); Umdenstock v. American Mortgage & Inv. Co., 495 F.2d
589 (10th Cir. 1974); Bowman v. White, 388 F.2d 756 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 891
(1968); Ryan v. New Castle County, 365 F. Supp. 124 (D. Del. 1973); Spens'v. Citizens Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 364 F. Supp. 1161 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Ely v. Velde, 356 F. Supp. 726 (E.D.
Va. 1973); Weiss v. Supasco, 295 F. Supp. 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
33. 383 U.S. at 725. The Court cautioned that the acceptance of pendent jurisdiction is
discretionary with the court. In deciding whether to implement the doctrine, a court may
consider, inter alia, judicial economy, convenience, fairness to the litigants, comity, federal-
ism, the possibility of jury confusion, and the state claim's dominance in the action. Id. at
726-27.
34. A pendent party claim requires joinder of a new party "against whom or by whom no
claim is asserted which has an independent jurisdictional base." Fortune, Pendent Jurisdic-
tion- The Problem of "Pendenting Parties," 34 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 1, 1 (1972). For additional
commentary on pendent party jurisdiction, see 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MIER & E. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE MD PROCEDURE: JURISDICON § 3567 (1975); Bratton, Pendent Jurisdiction
in Diversity Cases -Some Doubts, 11 SAN Dio L. REV. 296 (1974); Sullivan, Pendent
Jurisdiction: The Impact of Hagans and Moor, 7 1N. L. REV. 925, 942-59 (1974); Note, UMW
u. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HARv. L. REv. 657 (1968); Note, Federal Pendent Party
Jurisdiction and United Mine Workers v. Gibbs -Federal Question and Diversity Cases, 62
VA. L. Rav. 194 (1976); Comment, Aldinger v. Howard and Pendent Jurisdiction, 77 COLUM.
L. REV. 127 (1977); Comment, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Towards a Synthesis of
Two Doctrines, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 1263 (1975).
35. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
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ists.35 A section 1983 suit against a municipal officer cannot provide
a federal court with independent jurisdiction over a municipal cor-
poration, which is exempt from such actions; consequently,
Aldinger precludes the joinder of a state claim against a municipal-
ity with a federal claim brought under section 1983.31 The decision
in Aldinger thus further insulates municipalities from liability in
federal courts for their constitutional violations.
JOINDER OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND PENDENT STATE CLAIMS
In Gagliardi v. Flint38 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
sanctioned another procedure through which municipalities could
be subjected to liability in federal courts for their infringement of
plaintiffs' guaranteed federal rights. After her son had been fatally
shot by a Philadelphia police officer, the plaintiff filed suit against
the city in federal district court. The district court invoked its juris-
diction over the municipality as to two of the causes of action.39 The
plaintiff had based one of these claims directly on the fourteenth
amendment, alleging a denial of life, and had asserted the other as
a pendent state claim under the Pennsylvania Survival" and
Wrongful Death Statutes." The Third Circuit affirmed."
Substantiality
The Third Circuit approved the use of the fourteenth amendment
36. Id. at 10.
37. See, e.g., Note, Section 1983 and Federalism: The Burger Court's New Direction, 28
U. FLA. L. Rxv. 904, 919 n.122 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Federalism].
38. 564 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1977).
39. Id. at 114.
40. The Pennsylvania Survival Statute, 20 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3371 (Purdon 1975),
provides: "All causes of action or proceedings, real or personal, except actions for slander or
libel, shall survive the death of the plaintiff or of the defendant, or the death of one or more
joint plaintiffs or defendants."
41. The Pennsylvania Wrongful Death Statute, 12 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1601 (Purdon
1953), provides:
Whenever death shall be occasioned by unlawful violence or negligence, and no
suit for damages be brought by the party injured during his or her life, the widow
of any such deceased, or if there be no widow, the personal representatives may
maintain an action for and recover damages for the death thus occasioned.
42. 564 F.2d at 114. The court based its jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 (1970).
Although § 1331 federal question jurisdiction was not pleaded in the original proceedings, the
court of appeals invoked 28 U.S.C. § 1653 (1970) to permit the plaintiff to amend the jurisdic-
tional statement. 564 F.2d at 114. For the pertinent text of § 1331, see note 10 supra. For the
pertinent text of § 1343, see note 4 supra.
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claim in Gagliardi, not to hold the municipality liable, but to estab-
lish an independent jurisdictional basis enabling the district court
to adjudicate the pendent state cause of action. By finding the
constitutional claim sufficiently substantial to vest the district
court with federal question jurisdiction," the appellate court com-
bined the Bivens and pendent jurisdiction doctrines to impose lia-
bility on a municipality without resort to section 1983.
Although the substantiality test has been characterized as "more
ancient than analytically sound",44 its use for determining federal
jurisdiction nevertheless has been retained by the Supreme Court."
In Gagliardi the Third Circuit's determination that the plaintiff's
fourteenth amendment claim was sufficiently substantial derived
initially from the court's recognition that in Mount Healthy School
District Board of Education v. Doyle" the Supreme Court expressly
reserved the issue whether, by analogy to its decision in Bivens, a
plaintiff could imply a cause of action directly from the fourteenth
amendment that would not be subject to the limitations of section
1983.11 The absence of a Supreme Court holding specifically
deciding the question of the substantiality of a direct fourteenth
amendment suit based on Bivens, combined with the numerous
decisions in other courts permitting such causes of action,"' indi-
cated to the court that the constitutional claim was not so "'de-
void of merit as not to involve a federal controversy within thejurisdiction of the District Court.'"" Having obtained jurisdic-
tion, the district court could adjudicate the pendent state claim,
and the Third Circuit thus could avoid resolution of the difficult
constitutional question0 expressly reserved by the Court in Mount
Healthy. Such an approach comported with the doctrine of judicial
restraint in that constitutional issues unnecessary to the case's dis-
position were not adjudicated.51
43. 564 F.2d at 116.
44. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 404 (1970).
45. See, e.g., Hagans v. Ltvine, 415 U.S. 528, 538 (1974); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-
83 (1946).
46. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
47. 464 F.2d at 115 (quoting 429 U.S. at 278).
48. See note 25 supra.
49. 564 F.2d at 116 (quoting Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 543 (1974)).
50. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 546-47 & n.12 (1974).
51. The Supreme Court repeatedly has indicated that the federal courts should refrain
from the adjudication of constitutional issues when alternative grounds, including state
claims, for disposing of litigation exist. See, e.g., Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 629
1978] 583,
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Consistency with Prior Case Law
By combining the fourteenth amendment and the pendent state
claim, the Third Circuit did not contravene the prior standard es-
poused by the Supreme Court.2 Because a section 1983 suit was not
used to support the pendent state claim, the court in Gagliardi was
not bound by the Supreme Court's holding in Monroe that munici-
palities were not "persons" within the meaning of section 1983.0
Moreover, the result in Gagliardi presents no conflict with the Su-
preme Court's holding in Aldinger that, for purposes of pendent
jurisdiction, a federal court may not adjudicate state claims against
a party over whom no independent federal jurisdiction exists. 4
Aldinger precluded the joinder of a state claim against a separate
pendent party to a section 1983 cause of action under which the
court could exercise no jurisdiction over the defendant in the state
action. In Gagliardi, however, the City of Philadelphia was the de-
fendant in both the federal and the state claims; 5 the Third Circuit
thus permitted the joinder of a pendent state claim with a constitu-
tional claim under which the district court already had attained a
jurisdictional basis over the defendant municipality.
On the other hand, the two prerequisites for pendent jurisdiction
enunciated in Gibbs" were present in Gagliardi. As previously
noted, the constitutional claim, which alleged that the Philadelphia
police officer's actions had deprived the plaintiff's son of his four-
teenth amendment right to life, was sufficiently substantial to pro-
vide the district court with jurisdiction over the municipality. 7 In
addition, both claims arose from the fatal shooting and clearly
stemmed from a common nucleus of operative fact. Consequently,
the existing case law did not preclude the district court's decision
(1946); Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 448-49 (1930); Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co.,
213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909); Seals v. Quarterly County Court, 526 F.2d 216, 219 (6th Cir. 1975).
See also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 545-49 (1974).
52. See notes 6-8, 11-18, 35-37 supra & accompanying text.
53. See notes 7-8 supra & accompanying text.
54. See text accompanying notes 35-37 supra.
55. For the proposition that the Court should extend the rationale in Aldinger from its
application to pendent party jurisdiction to ordinary pendent jurisdiction, see Pendent Juris-
diction, supra note 28, at 148-49.
56. See notes 30-34 supra & accompanying text. A letter-brief filed by the City of Philadel-
phia with the court of appeals in Gagliardi protested vigorously the use of the fourteenth
amendment cause of action to obtain federal jurisdiction because the plaintiff allegedly never
relied on that portion of her complaint in the trial court. Letter-brief for Appellant at 4.
57. See text accompanying notes 46-49 supra.
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to extend its jurisdiction to the pendent state claim.
Litigants attempting to use the procedure approved in Gagliardi
must be certain that their claims based directly on the fourteenth
amendment are substantial in nature." This requirement, however,
nevertheless permits the assertion of constitutional claims for a wide
variety of injuries59 because governmental actions have had an in-
creasingly significant impact on individuals. Another potential ob-
stacle to the assertion of the theory advanced in Gagliardi is the
failure of state law to provide for a waiver of sovereign immunity.
Absent such a waiver, a pendent state claim cannot be maintained,
and the plaintiff could recover in federal court only if he litigated
successfully a direct cause of action against the municipality under
the fourteenth amendment." This restriction presents little threat
to suits against many municipalities, given the present trend to
dispense entirely with municipal immunity."
Policy Perspective
An injured plaintiff seeking relief for the deprivation of his federal
rights by a municipal employee ideally would attempt to sue both
the municipality and the individual committing the violation, to
litigate the action in a federal rather than in a state tribunal, and
to consolidate his federal and state claims through the use of pen-
dent jurisdiction. Under the Third Circuit's approach in Gagliardi,
each of these goals may be achieved.
58. See, e.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-38 (1974); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678,
682-83 (1946).
59. For example, in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), plaintiff's allegation that the Federal
Bureau of Investigation imprisoned him and subjected his home to a search was found to be
a substantial claim. Id. at 683. In Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974), the plaintiff's
allegation that the operation of a welfare regulation designed to recoup certain payments from
the plaintiff constituted a substantial deprivation was held to be sufficient to confer jurisdic-
tion on the federal court. Id. at 538. But see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), in which the
Court cautioned that not every injury caused by a state official acting under color of state
law could be deemed a substantial violation of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 699. In
Davis the Court concluded that the fourteenth amendment's guarantees of liberty and prop-
erty rights do not protect individuals' reputations from defamation. Id. at 709.
60. For a discussion of the viability of a direct constitutional cause of action against a
municipal defendant, see notes 22-28 supra & accompanying text.
61. For a compilation of cases in which states have abolished governmental immunity,
see Long v. Weirton, - W. Va. -, 214 S.E.2d 832, 854 (1975). The court in Ayala v.
Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, _...._, 305 A.2d 877,889 (1973), listed the position
of the various states regarding the decline of governmental immunity under both statutory
and common law. See also Note, Developing Governmental Liability Under 42 U.S. C. § 1983,
55 MINN. L. Rav. 1201, 1216 n.75 (1971).
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From a practical standpoint, allowing an injured citizen to sue
both the municipal corporation and its culpable employee is prefer-
able to restricting the imposition of liability to the individual perpe-
trator.12 Frequently, the commission of violations by groups of gov-
ernmental employees hinders subsequent identification of the po-
tential individual defendants. In such instances the victim may be
denied adequate relief.6 3
The partial immunity of public servants from legal liability fur-
ther demonstrates the practical necessity of permitting plaintiffs to
sue municipal corporations. The rationale for defenses such as good
faith and scope of duty64 is that the public's interest in the adminis-
tration of laws requires the alleviation of a public servant's fear of
personal liability for injuries resulting from the performance of his
duties. 5 Public officials should not be so fearful of potential per-
sonal liability that they hesitate to perform their responsibilities;
the victims of these officials' constitutional transgressions, however,
should not be denied an adequate remedy. By providing compensa-
tion for these injured citizens, a municipality would not discourage
individual officers from enforcing the law.66
Even if public servants are not immune, juries often are sympa-
thetic toward an officer who simply has attempted to perform his
62. The Court in Monroe acknowledged that it failed to weigh certain policy considerations
in its decision to exempt municipalities from § 1983 liability. Specifically, the Court stated
that it had not examined whether municipal corporations should be subject to liability be-
cause "private remedies against officers for illegal searches and seizures [were] conspicu-
ously ineffective, and that municipal liability [would] not only afford plaintiffs responsible
defendants but would cause those defendants to eradicate abuses that exist at the police
level." 365 U.S. at 191.
After considering many of the policy implications of municipal immunity, the United
States Commission on Civil Rights recommended that § 1983 be amended to reverse Monroe
legislatively. Kates & Kouba, supra note 8, at 143 n.67 (citing U.S. COMM'N ON Cwm I iGHTS,
LAW ENFORCEMENT: A REPORT ON EQUAL PROTECTION IN THE SOUTH 179 (1965)).
63. See, e.g., Burton v. Waller, 502 F.2d 1265, 1271, 1281-82, 1284, 1286 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 964 (1975) (court upheld acquittal of all 69 defendant police officers
partially because plaintiffs failed to prove which particular policemen fired shots); Howell v.
Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272, 279-84 (3d Cir. 1972) (affirmed directed verdict for two police officers
alleged to have brutally beaten plaintiff: plaintiff failed to prove whether defendants were
the policemen who administered beating).
64. Other such defenses include the absolute or qualified privileges held by some govern-
ment officers. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569 (1959).
65. K. DAvis, ADMImSTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 25.17 (1970 Supp.).
66. The establishment of a system rendering municipalities liable for their employees'
actions arguably could encourage governmental employees to violate the Constitution or, at
least, could remove an important deterrent to such actions. But see text accompanying notes
70-71 infra.
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duty. 7 Moreover, a plaintiff who successfully litigates his claim may
be unable to collect from an officer who has limited funds.68 By
permitting an injured party to sue the municipality, however, both
of these problems may be eliminated; juries would be less subjective
in their evaluation of the merits of the plaintiffs action, and a
successful litigant would be assured of receiving his entire damages
award. 9
The imposition of municipal liability also would provide a more
effective deterrent to future constitutional violations by public em-
ployees than does the unsatisfactory exclusionary rule or the spo-
radic imposition of individual tort liability.7" The economic pressure
of potential damages awards could provide municipal supervisors
with a greater incentive to control their subordinates' conduct. Be-
cause supervisors would be required to enforce more strictly suspen-
sion or dismissal penalties against culpable employees, they conse-
quently would encourage those employees to act only within the
scope of their authority.1
Federal courts provide a forum preferable to state tribunals for
adjudicating the type of state claims involved in Gagliardi. Initially,
the federal district court's invocation of the pendent jurisdiction
doctrine to join a federal and state claim not only provides a conven-
ience for the litigants but also promotes judicial economy.72 With
the consolidation of two potential proceedings into one, the parties
incur lower court costs and avoid the problems raised by inconsist-
ent adjudications or by the municipality's subsequent assertion of
collateral estoppel as a defense.73 In addition, adjudication by a
federal district court judge, whose life tenure helps to insulate him
from political pressure, may enable an injured plaintiff to avoid the
potential for bias in a state judge's review of other state officials'
67. See Damage Remedies, supra note 8, at 926.
68. Id. Many municipalities, however, provide tort liability insurance for their employees.
69. See Hundt, supra note 10, at 779.
70. K. DAVIS, supra note 65, at § 25.17. See generally Hundt, supra note 10, at 782-83;
Kates & Kouba, supra note 8, at 140-41; Damage Remedies, supra note 8, at 927; Implying a
Damage Remedy, supra note 8, at 125-26.
71. K. DAvIs, supra note 65, at § 25.17.
72. United Mine Worker v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
73. Minahan, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction of United States Federal District Courts,
10 CREIGHTON L. REv. 279, 321 n.198 (1976). See generally Comment, Section 1983 and the
New Supreme Court: Cutting the Civil Rights Act Down to Size, 15 DuQ. L. REv. 49, 89
(1976).
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actions." Finally, the selection of juries in federal proceedings from
broad-based citizen pools helps to ensure their impartiality. 7
Critics contend that the procedure approved in Gagliardi of in-
voking pendent jurisdiction compromises federalism and forces fed-
eral courts to assume jurisdiction over a broad range of traditional
state functions."8 Under the doctrine established in Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins, 7  however, federal courts have obtained vast experience
in the adjudication and application of state law.78 Should they com-
mit errors of law, appellate review is available. Moreover, because
a decision to accept pendent jurisdiction is discretionary with the
court, federal judges will abstain from deciding state claims, even
those properly joined with valid federal allegations, that require the
expert consideration available only in a state court.79
Others might argue that the extensive use of the pendent jurisdic-
tion procedure will flood the federal court docket with frivolous
claims.80 Such actions could be rejected immediately, however,
under the substantiality test,8 1 which authorizes dismissal of a
pendent state claim "if the federal claim to which it is attached is
74. Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83 HAv. L. REv. 1352, 1358 (1970). See
generally Kates & Kouba, supra note 8, at 145-46; 21 WAYNE L. REv. 1103, 1111-12 (1975).
75. See Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1861-1871 (1970 & Supp.
1978). The United States Commission on Civil Rights discussed the problem of discrimina-
tion in state juries. See 21 WAYNE L. REv. 1103, 1112 & n.54 (1975), (citing [1961] COMM'N
ON CrmL IRoHTs REP. bk. 5, at 92-94 (1961)).
76. See Federalism, supra note 37, at 916. See generally Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of
Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity, and the Federal
Caseload, 1973 LAW. & Soc. ORD. 557; Shakman, The New Pendent Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L. REv. 262 (1968).
77. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Court in Erie held that federal common law is inapplicable in
diversity cases and that, in such situations, a federal court must apply the substantive law
of the state in which it sits. Id. at 78.
78. See Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4 (1975) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 264 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring); Bivens
v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 400 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring);
Gavlik Constr. Co. v. H.F. Campbell Co., 526 F.2d 777 (3d Cir. 1975).
79. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); note 33 supra.
80. Since 1961, the number of suits filed in federal courts under the Civil Rights Act of
1871 has increased more than forty-fold. Note, Immunity of Teachers, School Administrators,
School Board Members, and School Districts from Suit Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1129, 1129 nn.2-3; see Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,
403 U.S. 388, 428-29 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
81. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 391 n.4 (1971);
Chevigny, supra note 74, at 1354 & n.14; notes 58-59 supra & accompanying text. This shifting
process can be facilitated by requiring plaintiffs to plead facts with specificity, a procedure
employed in the Third Circuit. See Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 922 (3d Cir.
1976).
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so insubstantial that it cannot serve as the basis for federal question
jurisdiction under the general federal question statute. 8 2 Inasmuch
as plaintiffs will continue to bring section 1983 suits against munici-
pal officers in federal courts, they simultaneously could assert their
claims against the pertinent municipalities, aid the two defendants
could be tried concurrently. Ultimately, then, the approach ap-
proved in Gagliardi could reduce the total number of suits brought,
in that all the federal and state claims deriving from a common
nucleus of operative fact could be adjudicated in one proceeding.
CONCLUSION
In Gagliardi v. Flint, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that a claim against a municipality based on a fourteenth
amendment violation by a government employee was sufficiently
substantial to vest jurisdiction in the federal district court. Having
jurisdiction, the district court adjudicated the pendent state claim
and thus rendered unnecessary a decision on the constitutional
question. This procedure provides an interim solution to a problem
created by the Supreme Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape, which
held that municipal corporations could not be sued under section
1983. It likewise is consistent with the Court's holding in Aldinger
v. Howard, which precludes the joinder of a pendent claim against
a separate party, because the municipal corporation would be the
defendant in both the federal and state claims. In providing a fed-
eral forum in which victims of constitutional infringements by mu-
nicipal employees can sue the municipalities directly, this approach
permits complete economic remuneration for those plaintiffs who,
for a variety of reasons, otherwise might be unable to recover from
the particular wrongdoer.
82. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 542-43 (1974) (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946)).
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